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A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SAMUEL RASCOFF’S 
PRESIDENTIAL INTELLIGENCE 
Carrie Cordero∗ 
Should foreign intelligence collection be subject to more rigorous 
oversight, and therefore, improved accountability, through a policy 
process that involves deeper personal involvement by the President 
and National Security Council (NSC)?  Would a greater number of po-
litical appointees across the intelligence community facilitate that over-
sight?  These are the essential questions posed by Professor Samuel 
Rascoff in his article Presidential Intelligence.1 
It is critical that the intelligence community continually evaluate 
how it can improve oversight and accountability of foreign intelligence 
activities.  Rascoff observes that “[it] makes little sense . . . to bar the 
White House from expressing a view about the desirability of spying 
on an ally, or weighing in on whether to forego controversial programs 
like metadata collection because their costs may outweigh their bene-
fits.”2  When put this way, presidential involvement in intelligence 
oversight is wholly unobjectionable.  But there is a presumption un-
derlying his proposals for oversight that is questionable.  Specifically, 
Rascoff presumes that the President and NSC are not currently, and 
have not been previously, involved in intelligence oversight to any sig-
nificant degree.  As discussed below, I would suggest that Rascoff un-
derestimates both presidential and NSC involvement in intelligence 
oversight, while also perhaps holding a romanticized view of what 
more granular NSC oversight would mean as a practical matter.  Fur-
ther, I would suggest that to bolster the type of oversight and account-
ability that we would agree is important, attention should be given to 
the role that the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) can play in 
this area. 
To begin, on the one hand, Rascoff asserts that the intelligence 
community has been left out of presidential influence and control.3  
But on the other hand, he acknowledges that organizational oversight 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Carrie Cordero is an attorney in private practice, Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown 
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 1 Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2016). 
 2 Id. at 695. 
 3 Id. at 635 (“The tectonic shift toward presidential control of agencies has reverberated 
throughout the federal bureaucracy, including a large swath of the national security state — with 
the striking exception of the so-called ‘intelligence community.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
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of the intelligence community has been “somewhat presidentialized.”4  
This much is true.  At least in the post-9/11 era, the President (and 
NSC, by extension) has been involved in substantially re-engineering 
the intelligence community.  These reforms include, as limited exam-
ples: creating the homeland security enterprise, starting with a presi-
dential advisor and culminating in a Secretary and Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS); adding new elements to the intelligence 
community; transforming the FBI into an organization with a primary 
national security mission alongside its law enforcement function; using 
national security surveillance capabilities and authorities for counter-
terrorism purposes and accompanying legislative proposals and chang-
es; developing the policy and implementation of a targeted-killing pro-
gram in support of the counterterrorism mission; creating the DNI to 
lead and manage the intelligence community; and, not insignificantly, 
revising the roles and responsibilities in the intelligence community by 
amending Executive Order 12,333 in 2008, including refining authori-
ties provided to the DNI.5  This is hardly a short list of modern presi-
dential disengagement.  Instead, one could conclude that the past  
decade-plus has been full of substantial and meaningful presidential 
and NSC involvement in intelligence matters. 
Rascoff further suggests that up until the Obama Administration’s 
review of signals intelligence collection priorities following the unau-
thorized disclosures of classified information beginning in June 2013, 
the policy process overseeing foreign intelligence collection lacked 
White House involvement.6  Thus, he characterizes the discipline of 
collection, in particular, as “[w]eakly [p]residentialized.”7  I would sug-
gest that this characterization of the policy process governing intelli-
gence collection priorities underestimates White House and senior pol-
icymaker involvement.  It is, however, a somewhat understandable 
characterization, given the limited information that is available public-
ly about this process, at least until recently. 
Presidential Policy Directive-288 (PPD-28), issued in January 2014, 
was presented as a new era of presidential oversight over the foreign 
signals intelligence collection process.  And it does include what may 
turn out to be substantial policy changes, including restrictions on the 
use of bulk collection, and enhanced privacy protections for non-U.S. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 4 Id. at 646. 
 5 See Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009) (amending Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 
C.F.R. 200 (1982)). 
 6 Rascoff, supra note 1, at 651–59. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive — Signals Intelligence 
Activities (PPD-28) (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17 
/presidential-policy-directive-signals-intelligence-activities [http://perma.cc/P97T-DNQ6]. 
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persons.9  More specifically, with respect to oversight of collection, 
PPD-28 directs “heads of departments and agencies” to review “priori-
ties and requirements.”10  There is nothing to suggest, however, that 
this process is much of a change from existing, or even longstanding, 
practice available to the President and the NSC. 
Instead, presidential or NSC involvement in reviewing intelligence-
collection priorities has likely ebbed and flowed over the decades, 
based on world events, national security threats, the management and 
leadership approach of a particular White House, and other priorities 
of the moment.  But that does not mean that there was not an institu-
tional process available to those participants, if they had chosen to en-
gage deeply with it.  Instead, I would suggest that priorities across and 
within presidential administrations shift, and, typical of White House 
involvement in many matters, it sometimes takes a crisis to mobilize 
attention and prompt action. 
PPD-28 gently acknowledges an existing policy process for collec-
tion oversight, in part, by referencing the directive’s classified Annex: 
which supplements the existing policy process for reviewing signals intelli-
gence activities, affirms that determinations about whether and how to 
conduct signals intelligence activities must carefully evaluate the benefits 
to our national interests and the risks posed by those activities.11 
In other words, contrary to what may be a prevailing understanding, 
there is, and has been, a process in place.  PPD-28 reaffirms that pro-
cess, and probably improves upon it and updates it. 
But because the Annex is classified, and because of the historical 
way the policy process was implemented, what exactly that policy pro-
cess was or is remains opaque.  I am not convinced it needs to be this 
way.  I believe deeply that much of what the intelligence community 
does — including operational matters, foreign intelligence targets, and 
sources and methods — is appropriately classified.  But perhaps there 
is a way to provide a clearer understanding about the policy process 
for approving collection requirements and conducting oversight of in-
telligence matters.12  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
General Counsel Bob Litt took a deliberate step in this direction by 
describing the current policy process in a February 2015 speech at the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Id. § 2. 
 10 Id. § 3. 
 11 Id. (emphasis added). 
 12 On October 27, 2015, the DNI released its new Principles of Intelligence Transparency Im-
plementation Plan.  The plan outlines how the intelligence community will institutionalize a new 
era of public disclosure as it relates to its mission and governance structure.  See OFFICE OF  
THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTELLIGENCE TRANSPARENCY IM-
PLEMENTATION PLAN 1 (2015), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and 
% 2 0 P u b s / P r i n c i p l e s % 2 0 o f % 2 0 I n t e l l i g e n c e % 2 0 T r a n s p a r e n c y % 2 0 I m p l e m e n t a t i o n % 2 0 P l a n . p d f 
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Brookings Institution.  In those remarks, Litt confirmed that the Pres-
ident sets intelligence priorities for the National Security Agency 
(NSA), not the other way around.13  Litt also went on to describe in 
detail how senior executives and policymakers are responsible for set-
ting collection priorities and requirements.14  Litt’s remarks confirm 
what has been true across administrations: the intelligence community 
serves the president and policy makers.  
Which is why it is curious that, in arguing for more robust over-
sight of intelligence collection by the President and NSC, Rascoff ap-
pears to dismiss the DNI in favor of an “expanded NSC process.”15  
Rascoff suggests that under the current model, “the relationship be-
tween the President and intelligence collection has largely defied the 
logic of presidential control.”16  I would suggest that this is an over-
statement.  The President has, if he so chooses, daily access to the DNI 
and intelligence briefings.  The authority provided to the DNI in the 
areas of budget, personnel, tasking, information sharing, protecting 
sources and methods, and acquisition17 suggests that the DNI, a politi-
cal appointee, is precisely the leader and institution to whom the Pres-
ident should be able to delegate the important functions that Rascoff 
identifies.  Why not continue to refine and improve the DNI’s function 
and performance, as opposed to shifting oversight responsibilities to 
the NSC?18  Indeed, because it is not operational, a significant focus of 
the DNI and his office is currently on oversight responsibilities.  The 
role of the DNI and other senior intelligence officials in carrying out 
oversight activities on behalf of the President and in support of his 
priorities are minimized in Rascoff’s article. 
But despite its flaws, Rascoff’s proposal to bolster oversight re-
sponsibility at the NSC is more meaningful than his proposal to in-
crease the number of political appointees across the intelligence com-
munity.  The second is more of a corollary to the first: increasing the 
number of political appointees would facilitate the expanded NSC 
reach by increasing its touch points throughout the community. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 See Robert S. Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Speech at the 
Brookings Institution on U.S. Intelligence Community Surveillance One Year After President 
Obama’s Address 10 (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2015/02/04 
-surveillance/20150204_intelligence_surveillance_litt_transcript.pdf [http://perma.cc/6N7D-PRA9]. 
 14 Id. at 10–13. 
 15 Rascoff, supra note 1, at 677. 
 16 Id. at 646. 
 17 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 18 Rascoff identifies the goals of harmonizing agencies, conducting (nonmonetary) cost-benefit 
analysis of proposed activities, and quantifying (in dollars) the costs and benefits of certain activi-
ties as functions that increased presidential or NSC involvement should provide.  See Rascoff, 
supra note 1, at 643.  I would suggest instead that these types of functions are exactly what Con-
gress and the President should expect of a DNI. 
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But Rascoff does not provide evidence (and I suspect that there is 
little) to support the proposition that the benefit of increasing the 
number of political appointees in the intelligence community would 
outweigh the downsides.  The purported benefit is that political ap-
pointees will be more effective at adhering to the President’s policy di-
rection in terms of intelligence collection priorities and accompanying 
political sensitivities.  But the downsides — frequent turnover in the 
high ranks of national security leadership; staff and operational na-
tional security personnel increasingly exposed to the politics of any 
given day; the increased potential for politicization of intelligence 
product; and long delays for those appointees requiring Senate confir-
mation — are substantial.19 
Perhaps the most well-known example of truly hands-on presiden-
tial involvement in a specific signals intelligence program in our post-
9/11 history was the Terrorist Surveillance Program.  But Rascoff al-
ludes that such a program is not what he means by presidential intelli-
gence, because oversight of that program did not involve sustained 
and rigorous oversight by the NSC.20  Therein lies a flaw in his pro-
posal: increased presidential involvement and concentration of 
decisionmaking in a small group of political appointees may not pro-
duce a result that he will like.  From this lens, Rascoff’s proposal to 
increase political oversight strikes me as unlikely to prevent a future 
controversial executive-directed action in an intelligence matter. 
I would suggest that the better investment would be to preserve 
presidential and NSC strategic guidance for intelligence collection pri-
orities, and to take steps to continually improve the institutional over-
sight of intelligence collection that resides outside of the NSC.  Those 
institutions include, for example, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, the Department of Justice, agency Inspectors General and 
internal privacy officers, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.  While the Pres-
ident will continue to have visibility and provide direction aligned 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 Rascoff also suggests that it would be an improvement to current foreign intelligence sur-
veillance oversight if intelligence lawyers presenting matters to the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC) did so with the understanding that “the White House might be paying atten-
tion.”  Id. at 690.  On the one hand, if the proposed surveillance concerns, for example, an 
emergent counterterrorism threat focused on a domestic target, then national security leaders in 
the executive branch, including the White House, would certainly be “paying attention” to the 
authorization and implementation of that surveillance, which might facilitate disrupting a poten-
tial terrorist act.  On the other hand, my experience suggests that the federal judges sitting on the 
FISC rely on the objective and professional presentation of national security matters, and would 
not view as a favorable development a Justice Department lawyer presenting the Court with the 
facts and legal theory of a proposed surveillance under FISA with an eye toward how “the White 
House” might think or react.  
 20 Rascoff suggests that “sustained, routinized governance by the White House and its compo-
nents, especially the NSC,” is what he really has in mind.  Id. at 655. 
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with policy objectives, these are the institutions that, from an institu-
tional governance perspective, should carry the responsibility of im-
proving the quality of their intelligence oversight activities, as opposed 
to minimizing their significance by placing greater responsibility di-
rectly on the NSC. 
 
